The Warrior Leadership Council developed the Actions on Contact Checklist as tool for T/Ms to use in gauging the performance of companies and platoons during their actions on contact at JRTC. In addition to three background questions, the checklist asked T/Ms whether or not units performed 43 separate tasks across three broad areas: planning, execution, and followup operations. The Council then compared the performance of units whose leaders were given copies of the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact, the experimental group, to the performance of earlier units that had not received the guide, the baseline group. Baseline data were drawn from 506 checklists collected by T/Ms during six consecutive unit rotations in 2010. Experimental data were then drawn from 248 checklists collected during three subsequent rotations that year.
vi Findings:
Over the span of nine rotations, areas of both relative strength and relative weakness were identified. Relatively high levels of performance were found during the consolidation and reorganization phase of operations, where four of the 10 strongest tasks were found. In contrast, eight of the 10 weakest small unit tasks were related to either planning or attack execution, suggesting the greatest improvement in unit actions on contact may come from concentrating training efforts in those two areas.
Some support for the efficacy of the Warrior Leader's Guide in improving unit performance was also found. Overall, units in the experimental group performed better than baseline units on 29 of the 43 tasks measured. In particular, experimental units performed significantly better on seven of those tasks, mostly during the consolidation and reorganization phase of operations. However, the strongest, and perhaps the most important, findings of the investigation were related to the conduct of unit rehearsals. Specifically, units that rehearsed the React to Contact battle drill before an operation performed significantly better on all nine measures of attack performance than units that did not rehearse this battle drill.
Utilization and Dissemination of Findings:
Findings were briefed to members of JRTC's Warrior Leadership Council in December of 2010. Based on the overall results, both the authors and members of the Warrior Leadership Council recommend the continued use of the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact by units training at JRTC, as well as by units training at their home stations. The continued use of the Actions on Contact Checklist at JRTC is also recommended, so T/Ms can systematically gather supporting unit performance data to use in their AARs. In particular, it is recommended that the checklist be included in the next printing of JRTC's T/M Handbook. Finally, T/Ms should strongly encourage units to conduct rehearsals prior to all operations, especially those likely to involve enemy contact. 
EVALUATING A JOB AID FOR ACTIONS ON CONTACT AT THE JOINT READINESS TRAINING CENTER

Introduction
Actions on contact broadly refer to those combat actions small units perform when they first encounter an enemy force. Small unit leaders direct their units to perform these actions, using a four-step decision-making process prescribed in doctrine (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003 Army, , 2006 Army, , 2007 Army, , 2010 . Whether contact is expected or unexpected, the first step is to deploy and report. Leaders typically establish base of fire and maneuver elements, engage the enemy, and then report the contact to higher headquarters. The second step is to evaluate and develop the situation. Here leaders gather as much information as possible about the characteristics of the enemy force and its probable intentions. In the third step, leaders choose a course of action that will accomplish their operational objectives, while maximizing the effects of terrain and minimizing casualties. In the fourth step, the selected course of action is executed as the unit begins to maneuver. During the execution, additional information about the enemy may emerge, which can cause leaders to alter their initial course of action. In practice, these four steps can be performed out of sequence, and some of them can even be performed simultaneously (U.S. Department of the Army, 2006).
Frequently conducted as part of company and platoon actions on contact, battle drills are a trained collective response of platoons and squads to commonly encountered combat situations, such as reacting to contact or breaking contact. Battle drills can be accomplished with minimal leader orders and are standard throughout the Army (U.S. Army Infantry School, 2006). They are performed rapidly in a prescribed sequence and are used in combat situations requiring an instantaneous or automatic response. Units become proficient in these drills through repetitive training and rehearsal. In terms of their immediacy and complexity, the decisions leaders make during actions on contact fall between the brief, quick decisions found in battle drills and the more deliberative and thorough decision-making process used in mission planning. (Evans, Snyder, & Carmicle, 2010) . As it considered investigating actions on contact, Council members noted that, historically, most small units conducted actions on contact and associated battle drills relatively well. Only recently was a declining performance trend noted in this area, as T/Ms began observing more instances of unit hesitation and confusion when an enemy force was initially encountered. The reason for this decline was unclear, though some hypothesized that competing training requirements related to current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have had the unintended consequence of reducing the amount of unit training time spent on rehearsing the individual and collective tasks needed to conduct effective actions on contact.
To address this problem the Council began collecting data about company and platoon actions on contact in February of 2010, using a T/M measurement instrument called the Actions on Contact Checklist (see Appendix A). Described in detail in the Research Approach section of this report, the checklist's design and content were based on the operational doctrine contained in four U.S. Army field manuals (U.S. Department of the Army, 2003 Army, , 2006 Army, , 2007 Army, , 2010 .
One purpose of the present investigation was to gauge the overall prevalence and quality of small unit actions on contact during force-on-force, situational training exercise (STX), and live fire missions at JRTC, in an attempt to pinpoint those areas in which units have the greatest difficulty. In particular, Council members wanted to determine the reasons why some units experience hesitation and confusion in their execution of actions on contact. They also wanted to identify relevant mission preparation factors most indicative of effective and ineffective operational performance across units.
A second purpose of the investigation was to evaluate, in a field environment, the effectiveness of a job performance aid that small unit leaders could use in planning for the conduct of actions on contact. This job aid was called the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact. Specifically, the Council wanted to determine if units given this guide at the beginning of their rotations would subsequently exhibit better performance during actions on contact than units that were not given the guide.
Job performance aids have a rich history of organizational application, especially in the military (see Schultz & Wagner, 1981; Swezey, 1987 ; U.S. Department of the Army, 1999). In fact, earlier JRTC investigations have found support for the efficacy of job aids and mission planning tools that were developed to improve troop leading procedures, information management, casualty evacuation, and tactical site exploitation (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans et al., 2007 Evans et al., , 2009 Evans et al., , 2010 .
Research Approach
The Actions on Contact Checklist was developed by JRTC's Warrior Leadership Council as a tool for T/Ms to use in measuring the performance of platoons and companies during the actions on contact observed in force-on-force, STX, and live fire missions at JRTC. The Council then developed the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact as a job performance aid that could potentially help small unit leaders plan, prepare for, and execute actions on contact. In evaluating the effectiveness of the Warrior Leader's Guide, the performance of units that were given these guides, the experimental group, was compared to the performance of units that had not received the guides, the baseline group. Six consecutive baseline rotations (including one pilot rotation) were followed by three subsequent experimental rotations. Although it would have been preferable to counterbalance or alternate the order of experimental and baseline unit rotations, the Council believed it would have been too difficult to execute a counterbalanced design flawlessly, given the highly decentralized nature of the data collection effort across JRTC Operations Group divisions. Additionally, the Council used the baseline data collection period to design and revise the Warrior Leader's Guide (i.e., the Guide was not ready for use prior to the seventh rotation).
Sample
Baseline data were drawn from 506 Actions on Contact Checklists completed by T/Ms during six consecutive JRTC rotations. Experimental data were then drawn from 248 Actions on Contact Checklists completed during three subsequent rotations. Over these nine rotations, 78.7% of the checklists were collected from platoons and 21.3% were collected from companies. Overall, 48.0% of the observed missions were STX missions, 44.7% were force-on-force missions, and 7.3% were live fire missions. The baseline and experimental groups did not differ significantly in terms of the echelons observed, though they did differ significantly in the types of missions observed. Compared with the baseline group, there was a lower percentage of STX missions (43.5% vs. 50.2%) and a higher percentage of live fire missions (11.2% vs. 5.4%) in the experimental group [χ 2 (2, N = 696) = 8.61, p = .013].
The baseline and experimental groups were not found to be significantly different in terms of the types of units and operations observed. Checklist percentages for various types of units are shown in Table 1 . Regarding the types of operations observed, 70.3% were expected and 29.7% were unexpected. Contact was initiated by the enemy in 86.2% of the operations and by friendly forces in 13.8% of the operations. A significantly greater percentage of the operations (20.2% vs. 10.7%) was initiated by friendly forces in the experimental group [χ 2 (1, N = 687) = 11.54, p = .001]. 100.0% Notes. RSTA = Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition. Types of units that comprised less than 5% of the total sample were grouped into a category called Other.
Actions on Contact Checklist
Company and platoon actions on contact were measured by T/Ms using the Actions on Contact Checklist (see Appendix A). Printed on the front and back of a yellow card that was approximately 8 in. tall and 5 in. wide (20.4 x 13.4 cm), the Actions on Contact Checklist was organized into five sections. Section I asked T/Ms for some general information, including the dates of observation, unit size, unit type, rotation phase, operation type, and whether friendly or enemy forces initiated contact.
Section II briefly dealt with the background of unit personnel, focusing on their general knowledge and preparedness to conduct actions on contact. Specifically, the checklist asked if the unit had a current standing operating procedure (SOP) for actions on contact and if individual Soldiers were familiar with the eight forms of contact (U.S. Department of the Army, 2007). T/Ms were also asked to list any references used to establish the unit SOP. One purpose of these items was to compare the general equivalence of units in the baseline and experimental groups, in terms of their initial capacity to perform actions on contact.
Section III dealt with the unit's mission planning process. For example, the checklist asked if courses of action for expected and unexpected enemy contact were developed and if unit personnel clearly understood those courses of action. The checklist also asked T/Ms if the observed unit rehearsed the React to Contact battle drill, if they conducted different kinds of rehearsals, and if various rehearsal techniques were used. Additionally, T/Ms were asked whether or not pre-combat checks (PCCs), pre-combat inspections (PCIs), and preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCSs) were performed prior to the unit's departure.
Section IV focused on the unit's execution of actions on contact and consisted of three subsections. The first subsection dealt with the unit's initial actions, including one pivotal question about the leader/commander's decision to either attack or break contact. Considered to be the most important part of the checklist by many Warrior Leadership Council members, the second subsection asked additional questions about the procedures used during the attack, including movement formations, movement techniques, and fire coordination. If the unit broke contact, T/Ms were instructed to skip the questions in the second subsection. Whether the unit attacked or broke contact, T/Ms were then asked about the unit's consolidation and reorganization practices in the third subsection. For example, they were asked if local security was established, if casualties were treated and evacuated, and if vehicles were recovered.
Section V was devoted to follow-up operations. Specifically, T/Ms were asked if units were reconstituted and prepared for future operations, if they conducted an AAR, if they were debriefed, and if the information obtained from the debriefing was disseminated internally and externally. Lastly, T/Ms were asked to list one area/subject the unit should sustain and one they should improve.
Most questions on the Actions on Contact Checklist called for a Yes or No response. The Warrior Leadership Council chose this response scale for two reasons. First, they thought a Yes/No format would be relatively easy to use, minimizing the data collection burden on T/Ms. Second, the Council believed this format would lower the amount of subjectivity contained in the checklist data, by simply asking T/Ms whether or not particular practices occurred, rather than asking them to decide how good those practices were.
Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact
The Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact was developed by members of JRTC's Warrior Leadership Council as a job performance aid that could potentially help small unit leaders plan, prepare for, and execute actions on contact. Designed as a pocket-sized reference, it was printed in color on both sides of one 8½ x 11 in. sheet (21.6 x 27.9 cm) with four separate panels on each side. When folded twice, an 8-page document was created that measured 5½ in. tall and 4¼ in. wide (14 x 10.8 cm). Its content summarized a variety of topics, including the following: 
Procedure
Through their JRTC Operations Group divisions, T/Ms were issued blank Actions on Contact Checklists prior to each baseline and experimental rotation. Completed checklists were then collected at a centralized location after each rotation had ended. In most instances, an interim analysis of the findings for each rotation was completed and presented to members of the Warrior Leadership Council prior to the beginning of the next rotation.
Copies of the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact were distributed to units in the three experimental rotations at the beginning of each rotation. Approximately 135 guides were distributed by Warrior Leadership Council members to battalion leaders at the beginning of each experimental rotation. Although these battalions were encouraged to distribute the guides to all of their company and platoon leaders, the exact number of company leaders receiving the guides was unclear. It should also be noted that providing leaders with guides did not guarantee they would be used during the rotation.
No attempt was made to keep T/Ms blind regarding the experimental condition in effect for each rotation (i.e., baseline vs. experimental). T/Ms on the Warrior Leadership Council should certainly have been aware of the experimental condition in effect, as they were
Results
The organization of this section closely parallels the general layout of the Actions on Contact Checklist (see Appendix A). Analyses of the results for individual checklist items were based on the calculation of descriptive statistics (i.e., frequency distributions). Chi-square tests were also performed for each item, as well as when the relationship between two items was of interest (e.g., how rehearsals were related to unit performance in an attack). Each analysis was based on the maximum sample size of checklists available for that analysis; thus, sample sizes varied somewhat across analyses due to missing checklist data.
Unit Background
Section II of the Actions on Contact Checklist dealt with the background of unit personnel, reflecting their potential degree of preparation for the successful conduct of actions on contact. Three background items were measured nominally (yes vs. no). Ideally, one would want baseline and experimental group units to be roughly equivalent in terms of their background characteristics, in order to make any resulting group differences in actions on contact more clearly interpretable. Unfortunately, this did not happen.
Results for the three background items are shown in Table 2 . Units in the baseline group performed better than experimental units on all three items, with statistically significant (p < .05) group differences found on two items. Compared with units in the experimental group, baseline units were significantly more likely to have used references in establishing their SOP and to have individual Soldiers who were familiar with the forms of contact. Across groups, the references most frequently listed by T/Ms in the second background item were a variety of U.S. Army field manuals. Overall, these results suggested that experimental units were not as well prepared for actions on contact as baseline units. One should keep this disadvantage in mind as the remaining results of the investigation are presented.
Planning
Section III of the Actions on Contact Checklist sought to determine whether or not units performed a series of 13 planning tasks. Results are summarized in Table 3 . Compared with the baseline units, a higher percentage of experimental units completed nine of the 13 tasks, with a statistically significant group difference on one task. Specifically, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have personnel who were informed about and understood the unit's courses of action for expected and unexpected enemy contact. Overall, these results suggested that units in the experimental group made slightly better plans for actions on contact than units in the baseline group. Among the five types of rehearsals performed by units (i.e., confirmation brief, back brief, combined arms rehearsal, support rehearsal, and battle drill/SOP rehearsal), no statistically significant group differences were found. Across all units observed, usage percentages ranged from 4.4% for the support rehearsal to 45.5% for the battle drill/SOP rehearsal. Regarding the six rehearsal techniques used (i.e., full dress, reduced force, terrain model, sketch map, map, and radio), only the terrain model was associated with a significant group difference [χ 2 (1, N = 752) = 4.45, p = .035]. Significantly more units in the experimental group used a terrain model (50.8%) than units in the baseline group (42.7%). Across all units observed, usage percentages ranged from 8.4% for the radio to 45.3% for the terrain model. It should be noted that units were not limited to using only one rehearsal type and one rehearsal technique, though 63.1% of the units used no more than one type of rehearsal and 55.2% used no more than one rehearsal technique. No significant group differences were found in the number of rehearsal types and techniques performed.
Execution
Section IV of the Actions on Contact Checklist sought to determine whether or not units executed a series of five initial actions, nine attack tasks, and 12 consolidation and reorganization tasks. Results for the initial actions are summarized in Table 4 . Compared with baseline units, a higher percentage of experimental units completed each of the five initial actions, though no statistically significant group differences were found. Overall, 70.5% of the units decided to attack, while 29.5% decided to break contact. Units in the baseline and experimental groups were not significantly different in this regard. Results for the attack tasks are summarized in Table 5 . Note these results are based on generally lower sample sizes, because they do not include the units who decided to break contact. Compared with baseline units, a higher percentage of experimental units completed six of the nine attack tasks, with a significant group difference on one task. Specifically, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have given a prearranged signal to the base of fire element to lift or shift fires to the opposite flank of the enemy position. No significant group differences were found in either the movement formations or movement techniques of assaulting units. Overall, the most frequently used movement formations were the wedge (49.5%), line (19.3%), column (18.2%), and herringbone (9.1%). The least frequently used formations were the file (6.1%), vee (3.0%), echelon (2.1%), and coil (0.7%). In terms of their movement techniques, most assaulting units used the traveling technique (41.4%), followed by bounding overwatch (33.6%) and traveling overwatch (25.0%). Similarly, no significant group differences were found in the individual movement techniques observed by T/Ms. Overall, the most frequently observed individual movement technique was the rush (89.3%), followed by the high crawl (8.7%) and low crawl (2.0%).
Results for the consolidation and reorganization tasks are summarized in Table 6 . For seven of the 12 tasks, the experimental units had higher completion rates than the baseline units, with significantly higher completion rates on four tasks. In particular, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have signaled their base of fire element to move to a designated position, to have established observation posts, to have covered the most dangerous avenues of approach for counterattack, and to have redistributed ammunition, critical equipment, and supplies. In contrast, baseline units had higher completion rates than experimental units for the remaining five tasks, with a significantly higher completion rate on one task (i.e., conducting tactical site exploitation operations). Combining the results for the 26 execution tasks contained in Section IV of the Actions on Contact Checklist, experimental group performance exceeded baseline group performance on 18 tasks (see Tables 4 through 6 ). Statistically significant group differences were found on six tasks, with higher experimental group performance found on five of those six. On balance, experimental group units tended to perform better on the execution tasks than baseline units, though the strongest group differences were found in the area of consolidation and reorganization.
Follow-up Operations
Section V of the Actions on Contact Checklist sought to determine whether or not units executed a series of four follow-up tasks. Results are summarized in Table 7 . A higher percentage of experimental units completed two of the four tasks, with a statistically significant group difference on one task. Specifically, units in the experimental group were significantly more likely than baseline units to have internally and externally disseminated the information they obtained from debriefing the unit in contact. Overall, these results suggested that the follow-up operations of experimental units were slightly better than those of baseline units. Notes. The task with a significantly different group percentage is shaded. AAR = After Action Review.
T/Ms provided written comments on 31.0% of the checklists. No group differences were found in either the number of T/Ms commenting or in the general thematic content of their comments. Overall, the most frequently mentioned areas for sustainment were communication (15% of the checklists), rehearsals (12%), and violence of action or aggressiveness (8%). The most frequently mentioned areas for improvement were communication (16%), rehearsals (12%), and movement/maneuver techniques (8%).
Strengths and Weaknesses
Excluding the three background items, a total of 43 unit performance tasks were measured nominally in the present investigation. Of these, 13 tasks were related to planning, 26 were related to the execution of actions on contact, and four were related to follow-up operations. Across all baseline and experimental units observed, the 10 tasks with the highest completion percentages are shown in Table 8 , while the 10 tasks with the lowest completion percentages are shown in Table 9 .
Rehearsals and Attack Execution
A unit's propensity to conduct rehearsals was found to have a strong positive relationship with mission accomplishment in three of four previous JRTC investigations (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans et al., 2007 Evans et al., , 2009 ). Although the Actions on Contact Checklist did not directly ask T/Ms about the mission accomplishment of observed units, the nine attack tasks in the execution section of the checklist are the items most similar to the mission accomplishment concept. Using these nine tasks as mission accomplishment criteria, a comparison of units that rehearsed the React to Contact battle drill with units that did not rehearse this battle drill was performed. The results of this comparison are summarized in Table 10 . Across all baseline and experimental rotations, rehearsing units performed significantly better than non-rehearsing units on each of the nine tasks. 
Discussion
One purpose of the present investigation was to determine the overall prevalence and quality of small unit actions on contact during JRTC training missions, in an attempt to pinpoint those areas in which units have the greatest difficulty. Based on the combined results from nine JRTC rotations, several areas of relative weakness were found (see Table 9 ). Eight of the 10 weakest small unit tasks were related to either planning (e.g., developing & rehearsing a plan for enemy prisoners of war) or attack execution (e.g., moving into an assault position without being detected). These results suggested the greatest improvement in unit actions on contact may come from concentrating training efforts in these two areas. In contrast, one area of relative strength was also found (see Table 8 ). Specifically, four of the 10 most strongly performed tasks were in the area of consolidation and reorganization (e.g., treating & evacuating casualties).
A second purpose of the investigation was to evaluate the effectiveness of the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact. Overall, units that were given this job performance aid at the beginning of their rotations had higher completion percentages than baseline units on 29 of the 43 tasks measured. Experimental units performed significantly better than baseline units on seven of these tasks, particularly in the area of consolidation and reorganization. This rather modest level of efficacy for the Warrior Leader's Guide was found despite the fact that experimental units were not as prepared to perform actions on contact as were those in the baseline group (see Table 2 ).
The effectiveness of the Warrior Leader's Guide for improving unit performance during actions on contact was not as strong as the effectiveness of several other job performance aids that have been evaluated at JRTC (Evans & Baus, 2006; Evans et al., 2007 Evans et al., , 2009 Evans et al., , 2010 . Because small unit actions on contact have traditionally been trained through the use of battle drills, it was probably unrealistic to expect small unit leaders would have the time to refer to a pocket reference during a firefight. Indeed, we found the guide to have its greatest value during the post-attack period of consolidation and reorganization, perhaps serving to remind leaders of the various unit tasks that need to be accomplished at that time.
Another factor limiting the observed effectiveness of the job performance aid in the present investigation was the high likelihood that some leaders in experimental group units may not have used the Warrior Leader's Guide in planning and executing their actions on contact. Specifically, we did not know which leaders actually used the guide and which did not. One way to obtain this kind of information in future investigations would be to include a question about observed job aid usage on the measurement instrument (i.e., the checklist) being used by T/Ms.
Our strongest, and perhaps the most important, findings were related to the conduct of unit rehearsals. Units that rehearsed React to Contact performed significantly better on all nine measures of attack performance than units that did not rehearse this battle drill (see Table 10 ). In comparing the relative effectiveness of rehearsals versus job performance aids for improving the actions on contact of most units, the results are clear. Battle drill and mission rehearsals are much more likely to have a positive impact on unit performance than distributing job aids to leaders, at least in the area of small unit actions on contact.
Based on the overall results obtained in the present investigation, both the authors and members of the Warrior Leadership Council recommend the continued use of the Warrior Leader's Guide for Actions on Contact by units training at JRTC, as well as by units training at their home stations. The continued use of the Actions on Contact Checklist at JRTC is also recommended, so T/Ms can systematically gather supporting unit performance data to use in their AARs. In particular, it is recommended that the checklist be included in the next printing of JRTC's T/M Handbook. Finally, T/Ms should strongly encourage units to conduct rehearsals prior to all operations, especially those likely to involve enemy contact. 
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